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At the Edge of Objectivity: The Missouri 
Court of Appeals’ Deference to a Seemingly 
Subjective Assessment of Prejudice Under 
Strickland 
Dawson v. State, No. WD 82441, 2020 WL 3966847 (Mo. App. W.D. July 14, 
2020), reh'g and/or transfer denied (Aug. 27, 2020) 
Bradley J. Isbell* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Strickland v. Washington is often heralded as one of the most 
important criminal procedure cases of the last century.1  The opinion 
created a two-prong framework for analyzing a post-conviction relief 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel: performance and prejudice.2 
The focus of this Note is the prejudice prong, specifically when the post-
conviction court is the same court that presided over a defendant’s trial or 
sentencing.  
 Imagine an inmate’s post-conviction counsel argues that the 
defendant received ineffective assistance before the trial court because 
 
* B.S., University of Arkansas, 2015; M.S., University of Arkansas, 2017; J.D. 
Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2022; Associate Member, Missouri 
Law Review, 2020-2021, Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2021-
2022. I am grateful to Professor Litton for his insight, guidance, and support during 
the writing of this Note, the talented attorneys in the Criminal Appeals Division of the 
Missouri Attorney General’s Office for introducing me to this topic, as well as the 
Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing process. 
 1. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see also Adam N. Steinman, 
Case Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1947, 1967 n.109 (2017). 
 2. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. As explained in more detail infra, the first prong, 
performance, regards the actual assistance provided by legal counsel. The prejudice 
prong evaluates what impact, if any, counsel’s deficient performance had on the 
outcome of the proceeding. 
1
Isbell: At the Edge of Objectivity: The Missouri Court of Appeals’ Defere
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
932 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
 
trial counsel failed to present readily available, mitigating evidence.3  
Under Strickland’s second prong, post-conviction counsel must argue that 
trial counsel’s failure caused prejudice: a reasonable probability exists that 
the unpresented evidence would have resulted in a shorter sentence.4  How 
should the post-conviction court assess whether the evidence would have 
resulted in a shorter sentence?  In the event that the post-conviction court 
is the same as the sentencing court, should the court simply ask a 
subjective question: is there a reasonable probability that it would have 
imposed a shorter sentence?  Conversely, should the post-conviction court 
divorce its inquiry from its role at sentencing and engage in an objective 
inquiry: is there a reasonable probability that the evidence would have 
resulted in a shorter sentence from an impartial, fair court?  Reading 
Strickland in light of its specific facts seemingly foreclosed this decision 
in favor of objectivity.5 
However, in Dawson v. State, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the 
Western District, came to the opposite conclusion.6  The court entertained 
an appeal from a motion court’s7 rejection of a motion for post-conviction 
relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel, where the motion court 
also presided over the appellant’s sentencing.8  In line with its approach 
for the last decade, the Western District took the subjective approach.9  It 
gave special deference to the lower court’s prejudice analysis under 
Strickland precisely because that court would presumably know whether 
trial counsel’s alleged failures would have altered its sentencing 
decision.10  In fact, the Court of Appeals stated that a post-conviction 
court’s prejudice analysis in such a circumstance is “virtually 
unchallengeable.”11 
Part II of this Note details the facts and holding from Dawson v. State, 
with particular attention to the court’s analysis of prejudice under the 
 
 3. Mitigating evidence is evidence that is presented by defense counsel during 
the sentencing phase of a capital trial that suggests that the defendant should be 
sentenced to life in prison rather than death. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 
114–15 (1982). 
 4. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
 5. Id. at 700–01. 
 6. Dawson v. State, 611 S.W.3d 761, 768 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020). 
 7. A motion court is the lower court that originally hears a motion for post-
conviction relief. 
 8. Id. at 763. 
 9. See id. at 768. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 769 (quoting Cherco v. State, 309 S.W.3d 819, 825 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2010)). 
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Strickland standard.  Part III provides the legal context in which Dawson 
was decided.  This includes identifying the source of the Strickland 
standard, as well as its interpretation in both federal and Missouri state 
courts.  Part IV discusses the reasoning behind the prejudice analysis in 
Dawson, including Judge Alok Ahuja’s concurrence, which draws 
attention to potential weaknesses in the majority’s reasoning, given the 
context in which Strickland was decided.  Part V provides commentary on 
Dawson, noting the difficulty in applying Strickland’s prejudice prong 
when the post-conviction court also presided over the underlying criminal 
case.  It also contemplates the appropriateness of such an arrangement.  
Part VI concludes and provides suggestions for further research.  
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
On November 16, 2015, Gabriel Dawson was placed on probation by 
the juvenile division of the Circuit Court of Buchanan County, Missouri 
for several acts of juvenile delinquency.12  On May 17, 2016, Dawson 
participated in a robbery, during which an accomplice to the robbery 
died.13  After the robbery, the juvenile division of the prosecutor’s office 
filed a motion to prosecute Dawson as an adult, and the juvenile court 
granted the motion.14  Dawson was then charged with the class B felony 
of attempted first-degree robbery.15 On October 6, 2016, at the age of 
sixteen, Gabriel Dawson pleaded guilty to attempted first-degree robbery 
for the crime committed on May 17, 2016, in exchange for the prosecutor 
agreeing not to seek felony murder charges.16  Dawson’s plea and 
sentencing hearings were before Judge Patrick K. Robb, of the Circuit 
Court of Buchanan County, Missouri.   
During Dawson’s sentencing hearing, the trial court questioned him 
about his understanding of the plea process.17  He affirmed that he 
understood that he was facing a range of punishment of up to fifteen years 
with no probation.18  Dawson also affirmed that no one had promised him 
a particular sentence in exchange for his plea.19  The sentencing court 
found that Dawson’s plea was made voluntarily and knowingly.20  On 
 
 12. Id. at 764. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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December 12, 2016, the court sentenced Dawson to fourteen years in the 
custody of the Missouri Department of Corrections. 21  After the sentence 
was announced, Dawson confirmed to the sentencing court that he was 
satisfied with the legal representation that he had received from plea 
counsel.22  
Dawson then timely filed a pro se motion to vacate, amend, or set 
aside his sentence under Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 24.035.23  The 
court appointed post-conviction counsel to Dawson, who then filed an 
amended complaint on his behalf.24  The amended motion claimed that 
Dawson was denied effective assistance of counsel at sentencing because 
(1) plea counsel, who also represented Dawson at sentencing, failed to 
investigate and present mitigating evidence of adolescent development at 
Dawson’s sentencing hearing; and (2) plea counsel failed to investigate 
and present mitigating evidence from Dawson’s family members and 
weightlifting coach at Dawson’s sentencing hearing.25  The amended 
motion claimed that Dawson was prejudiced by both of plea counsel’s 
alleged failures because there was a reasonable probability that, but for 
them, he would have received a lesser sentence.26  
Dawson’s post-conviction proceedings, including an evidentiary 
hearing, were before Judge Robb, who also presided over Dawson’s 
underlying criminal plea and sentencing proceedings.27  At the evidentiary 
hearing, a neuropsychologist testified regarding adolescent brain behavior 
generally, as well as regarding her personal evaluation of Dawson when 
he was seventeen.28  Dawson’s mother, grandmother, great-aunt, and 
weightlifting coach each testified to Dawson’s character.29  Conversely, 
Dawson’s plea counsel testified that Dawson told her he wanted to take 
responsibility for his actions during sentencing and that she had advised 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id.; Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035(b) (“A person seeking relief pursuant to this Rule 
24.035 shall file a motion to vacate, set aside or correct the judgment or sentence . . . 
The motion shall be filed no earlier than the date the sentence is entered if no appeal 
is taken, including if no appeal is taken after any remand of the judgment or sentence 
following a prior appeal, or the date the mandate of the appellate court issues affirming 
the judgment or sentence.”). 
 24. Dawson, 611 S.W.3d at 764. 
 25. Id. at 764–65. The amended motion also claimed that Dawson’s right to due 
process was violated because the sentencing court failed to consider him for dual 
juvenile/criminal jurisdiction under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.073. Id. at 764. 
 26. Id. at 764–65. 
 27. Id. at 761–63. 
 28. Id. at 765. 
 29. Id. 
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against hiring an expert to testify to Dawson’s mental development.30  Plea 
counsel also testified that Dawson told her he did not want his mother to 
testify at his sentencing hearing, and that the weightlifting coach was 
contacted but was unavailable to testify at the sentencing hearing.31 
The motion court, the venue where a motion for post-conviction relief 
(“PCR”) is heard,32 denied Dawson’s Rule 24.035 motion for PCR, 
concluding that even if plea counsel had presented at sentencing the 
mitigating evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, Dawson would 
not have received a shorter sentence.33  The Missouri Court of Appeals, 
Western District, heard the case on appeal and upheld the judgment of the 
motion court.34  It found that the motion court’s conclusion that 
Strickland’s prejudice prong was not met was objectively reasonable and 
not clearly erroneous.35  The court reasoned that, based on its own 
precedent, where the motion court had the benefit of also being the 
sentencing court “the motion court’s ruling as to the impact of character 
witnesses” at sentencing is “virtually unchallengeable,” indicating 
deference to a seemingly subjective analysis of prejudice below.36 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This section first discusses the origins of the Strickland standard in 
the United States Supreme Court.  Next, it examines the application of 
Strickland’s prejudice prong in Missouri state courts.  Finally, it presents 
decisions from United States Courts of Appeals to illustrate Strickland’s 
interpretation and application in federal courts.   
 
 30. Id. at 770. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See, e.g., Id. at 763 (“Specifically, Mr. Gabriel Knight Dawson (“Dawson”) 
appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Buchanan County, Missouri 
(“motion court”), denying his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief after an 
evidentiary hearing.”). In Missouri, the motion court is often the same as the trial 
court, the court where the underlying criminal conviction occurred. See, e.g., id. 
(“[This appeal] also involves a procedural scenario in which the sentencing court and 
the post-conviction relief motion court are one and the same.”).  
 33. Dawson, 611 S.W.3d at 771. 
 34. Id. at 772. 
 35. Id. at 768, 772. 
 36. Id. at 771. 
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A. Origins of the Strickland Standard 
The framework for analyzing a post-conviction claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel was set forth in the Supreme Court of the United 
States’s seminal decision in Strickland v. Washington.37  In Strickland, the 
Supreme Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment guarantees to 
criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel.38  This 
right is violated both when the Government denies a defendant access to 
counsel, and when counsel’s own deficient performance denies a 
defendant “adequate legal assistance.”39  The Supreme Court established 
a two-prong test for analyzing a post-conviction claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, colloquially known as the “Strickland standard.”40  
First, a movant must show that counsel’s performance was objectively 
deficient.41  Second, a movant must show that counsel’s deficient 
performance prejudiced the movant.42  If a movant fails to show either 
prong, “it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted 
from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result 
unreliable.”43  
The first prong of the Strickland standard, the performance prong, 
governs the performance of defense counsel.44  The Supreme Court held 
that the applicable threshold required to ensure a fair trial is that of 
“reasonably effective assistance.”45  This requires a movant to show 
specific acts or omissions by defense counsel that do not fall within the 
scope of reasonable professional judgment.46  The motion court must then 
judge the reasonableness of defense counsel’s challenged conduct in light 
of the facts of the case at the time of the alleged acts or omissions.47  
Strickland demands that motion courts begin their evaluation with a strong 
presumption that defense counsel’s assistance was effective and that the 
challenged actions resulted from “reasonable professional judgment.”48  
 
 37. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–700 (1984). 
 38. Id. at 684–86. 
 39. Id. at 686 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)). 
 40. Id. at 687. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 690. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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Further, Strickland sets out that strategic choices made by counsel after an 
investigation of law and facts are “virtually unchallengeable.”49 
The second prong of the Strickland standard, much like a plain error 
review, requires a movant to show that he or she was prejudiced by defense 
counsel’s deficient performance.50  The movant must show a reasonable 
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different but 
for counsel’s unprofessional errors.51  Strickland requires that an 
assessment of prejudice “should proceed on the assumption that the 
decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the 
standards that govern the decision” of guilt of sentencing.52  The Supreme 
Court explained that this objective approach entails excluding the 
“idiosyncrasies of the particular decisionmaker,” including the particular 
judge’s sentencing practices.53   
In the underlying criminal case, Washington waived his right to an 
advisory jury during the sentencing phase.54  The trial judge found that the 
aggravating factors in the case outweighed the mitigating factors and 
sentenced Washington to death.55  After Washington unsuccessfully 
exhausted his PCR claims in Florida’s state court system, he filed a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court claiming 
ineffective assistance of counsel for – among other things – trial counsel’s 
alleged failure to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence 
at sentencing.56  The district court held an evidentiary hearing on 
Washington’s claims.57  The trial judge from Washington’s criminal 
proceeding testified that even if trial counsel had presented additional 
mitigating evidence, it would not have affected the sentence the trial judge 
imposed.58  Relying in part on this testimony, the district court denied 
Washington’s petition because it found no reasonable probability that the 
alleged errors by trial counsel affected the outcome of sentencing.59  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 691–92. 
 51. Id. at 691–92. 
 52. Id. at 695. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 672. Under Florida’s capital sentencing scheme in place at the time, a 
defendant had the right to an advisory jury during the sentencing phase of trial, 
although the ultimate sentencing decision rested with the judge. Id. 
 55. Id. at 678–79. 
 56. Id. at 678. 
 57. Id. at 679. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 683. 
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remanded the case, and petitioner, the State of Florida, filed a petition for 
a writ of certiorari.60  
To illustrate the objective approach to determining prejudice, the 
Supreme Court applied this newly minted standard to the facts of 
Washington’s claim. 61  The Court made clear that its conclusion that 
Washington’s claim did not meet either the performance or the prejudice 
prong did “not depend on the trial judge’s testimony at the District Court 
hearing,” and that “that testimony [was] irrelevant to the prejudice 
inquiry.”62 
In 2007, and in the wake of Strickland, the Supreme Court heard 
Schriro v. Landrigan, another claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.63  
In Landrigan, the defendant, Landrigan, filed a petition for PCR following 
a sentence of death for capital murder.64  The same judge who sentenced 
Landrigan to death presided over the post-conviction court that heard his 
petition.65  Landrigan’s petition was denied by the post-conviction court 
without an evidentiary hearing because the record clearly showed that his 
counsel’s performance was not deficient—the first prong of Strickland.66  
On review, the Supreme Court held that the motion court’s determination 
of the facts was reasonable and noted that because the judge presiding over 
the post-conviction court also presided over the underlying criminal case, 
she was “ideally situated” to assess the factual record of the underlying 
case.67  Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, agreed that some special 
deference was owed to the post-conviction court’s interpretation of the 
sentencing transcript.68  
B. Strickland Applied in Missouri State Courts 
In Missouri state courts, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
is properly brought as a motion for PCR pursuant to either Missouri Rule 
of Civil Procedure 24.035 or 29.15.69  Under either rule, the motion court 
 
 60. Id. at 698–99. 
 61. Id. at 698–99. 
 62. Id. at 700. 
 63. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007). 
 64. Id. at 469–71. 
 65. Id. at 471. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 476. 
 68. Id. at 495 (Steven, J., dissenting). 
 69. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035 (providing an avenue for postconviction relief 
following a guilty plea); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15 (providing an avenue for 
postconviction relief following a felony conviction by a judge or jury). 
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is required to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law, whether or not 
an evidentiary hearing is held.70  Both rules limit appellate review of a 
motion court’s ruling to “a determination of whether the findings and 
conclusion of the trial court are clearly erroneous.”71  In the context of 
reviewing the prejudice prong of claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a line of precedent in the Southern and Western Districts of the 
Missouri Court of Appeals has emerged that conflicts with Strickland’s 
framework of objectivity.  
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing following 
a guilty plea was first brought before the Missouri Court of Appeals in 
2009, when the Southern District, heard Joos v. State.72  In Joos  ̧ the 
movant claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move 
to dismiss certain venirepersons for apparent bias.73  The motion court 
concluded that this failure could not have prejudiced the movant because 
the venirepersons in question were excused for other reasons and did not 
ultimately sit on the movant’s jury.74  In affirming the motion court’s 
decision, the Southern District concluded that the motion court’s findings 
“carry special weight” because the motion court had also been the trial 
court in the underlying criminal case.75  This statement was supported by 
citations to several past decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri and 
Missouri Court of Appeals, which discussed a trial court being in the best 
position to control voir dire because it can see and hear potential jurors 
respond to questioning.76  However, each of the cited cases concerned a 
direct appeal with a claim of trial court error, not a PCR proceeding.77  
Therefore, none of the cases that the Joos court relied on dealt with an 
 
 70. Id. at 24.035(j). 
 71. Id. at 24.035(k). 
 72. Joos v. State, 277 S.W.3d 802, 804 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). 
 73. Id. at 804. A venireperson is a member of an entire panel from which a jury 
is drawn. Venire, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). 
 74. Joos, 277 S.W.3d at 804. 
 75. Id. at 804–05. 
 76. Id. (citing State v. Taylor, 166 S.W.3d 599, 608 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)) 
(concluding that the trial court is “in the best position to determine the impact of a 
juror’s statement upon other members of the panel.”); State v. Smulls, 935 S.W.2d 9, 
19 (Mo. 1996) (en banc) (acknowledging broad discretion for a trial court’s 
determination of whether a jury panel should be dismissed); State v. Evans, 802 
S.W.2d 507, 514 (Mo. 1996) (en banc) (acknowledging broad discretion for a trial 
court’s determination of whether a jury panel should be dismissed). 
 77. State v. Taylor, 166 S.W.3d 599, 602 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); Smulls, 935 
S.W.2d at 17; Evans, 802 S.W.2d at 510. 
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application of Strickland because they were not claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.78 
A year later, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District heard 
Cherco v. State, which was the first time a Missouri Court of Appeals 
showed special deference to the prejudice determination of a motion court 
that was also the sentencing court in the underlying criminal case.79  In 
Cherco, the Western District relied on the Supreme Court of Missouri’s 
interpretation of the prejudice analysis defined in Strickland.80  The court 
held that in such a circumstance, a movant must show that but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the movant would have received a lesser 
sentence.81  The Cherco court determined that the motion court’s 
conclusion that there was no reasonable probability that additional 
mitigation evidence would have resulted in a lesser sentence for the 
movant was not clearly erroneous.82  The court noted that, “[H]ere, the 
sentencing court and the motion court are one in the same, rendering a 
motion court’s finding that character witnesses would not have 
ameliorated the sentence virtually unchallengeable under the clearly 
erroneous standard.”83  
In Scroggins v. State, the Western District again acknowledged a 
heightened degree of deference to a motion court hearing a PCR claim 
when that court also presided over the underlying criminal case. In that 
case, however, deference was given to the motion court’s review of the 
record, and not its determination of prejudice.84  In Scroggins, the motion 
court denied Scroggins’s motion for PCR.85  On review, the Western 
District noted that the motion court was particularly well situated to review 
the facts from the underlying record and the motion for PCR because the 
motion court was also the sentencing court.86  While the motion court 
determined that the facts did not support a possible finding of prejudice, 
 
 78. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 79. Cherco v. State, 309 S.W.3d 819, 828, 831 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
 80. Id. at 828 (citing Middleton v. State, 103 S.W.3d 726, 733 (Mo. 2003) (en 
banc) (holding that Strickland prejudice requires a showing that “but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 81. Id. at 830–31. 
 82. Id. at 831. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Scroggins v. State, 596 S.W.3d 163, 168 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020). 
 85. Id. In Missouri, a movant seeking PCR is only entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing if the motion alleges facts that are not disputed by the record which, if true, 
would warrant relief. Patterson v. State, 576 S.W.3d 240, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019). 
 86. Scroggins, 596 S.W.3d at 168. 
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which should have implicated the objective analysis detailed in Strickland, 
the language used by the Western District was more akin to the United 
States Supreme Court’s ruling in Landrigan.87  Like Landrigan, here the 
motion for PCR was denied without an evidentiary hearing.88  The 
appellate court’s review, therefore, was limited to determining whether the 
motion court’s determination that the facts alleged in Scroggins’s PCR 
motion would not warrant relief if true was clearly erroneous, as opposed 
to conducting a full Strickland analysis of the merits of the PCR claim 
following an evidentiary hearing.89  Consequently, the heightened 
deference given here may not conflict with Strickland in the way that 
language in Joos, Cherco, and Dawson does.90  
Both the Southern and Western Districts of the Missouri Court of 
Appeals have recognized this special degree of deference to a motion court 
that also served as the trial court in the underlying criminal case.91  
However, the Supreme Court of Missouri has yet to address this issue. 
C. Interpretations of Strickland in Federal Circuit Courts 
Several federal circuit courts have confronted the Strickland issue, 
each concluding that Strickland requires an objective, not subjective, 
analysis of prejudice.92  In Sealey v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison, 
a movant’s post-conviction counsel presented an affidavit at the movant’s 
PCR hearing from a juror in the defendant’s underlying criminal case.93  
The juror stated that if additional mitigating evidence about the 
defendant’s family had been presented during sentencing, it would have 
made a difference in the juror’s decision.94  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit still held that it was reasonable for the 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 163. 
 89. Id. at 165; see also Patterson, 576 S.W.3d at 243. 
 90. See Dawson v. State, 611 S.W.3d 761 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020); Cherco v. State, 
309 S.W.3d 819, 828 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010); Joos v. State, 277 S.W.3d 802 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2009). 
 91. See Scroggins, 596 S.W.3d at 168; Goodwater v. State, 560 S.W.3d 44, 55 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2018); McKee v. State, 540 S.W.3d 451, 458–59 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018); 
Noland v. State, 413 S.W.3d 684, 687 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
 92. Sealey v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison, 954 F.3d 1338, 1358 (11th Cir. 
2020); Garner v. Lee, 908 F.3d 845, 862 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1608 
(2019); Williams v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1326, 1344 (11th Cir. 2008); White v. Ryan, 895 
F.3d 641, 670 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 93. Sealey, 954 F.3d at 1358. 
 94. Id. 
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state court to conclude that the defendant did not prove prejudice because 
the prejudice “inquiry under Strickland is an objective one.”95 
The Eleventh Circuit faced the same issue in Williams v. Allen, where 
the same judge who sentenced the defendant to death in the underlying 
criminal proceedings also presided over the defendant’s PCR 
proceedings.96  In his PCR motion, the defendant raised a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing for a failure to present 
mitigation evidence.97  The judge found no reasonable probability that the 
additional mitigation evidence would have changed the sentence he 
imposed.98  On review, the Eleventh Circuit held that “a trial judge’s post-
hoc statements concerning how additional evidence might have affected 
its ruling are not determinative for purposes of assessing prejudice.”99  The 
court concluded that the defendant in fact did prove prejudice, reversing 
the district court’s ruling.100 
In Garner v. Lee, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit reviewed the United State District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York’s grant of habeas corpus for a defendant’s post-conviction 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.101  In its ruling, the lower court 
concluded that the prejudicial impact of potentially inadmissible evidence 
was apparent from post-trial statements made by jurors to the media.102  
The Second Circuit noted that “to the extent the district court relied on a 
juror’s post-trial statements to evaluate Strickland prejudice, . . . the 
district court committed error.”103  The court further expounded that the 
proper focus of a prejudice inquiry is “the reliability of the result, from an 
objective viewpoint,” so evidence about the actual decision-making 
process should not be considered.104  After reviewing the record de novo, 
the Second Circuit concluded that the state court did not err in finding no 
prejudice and therefore vacated the district court’s grant of habeas 
corpus.105  
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Williams, 542 F.3d at 1344. 
 97. Id. at 1331–32. 
 98. Id. at 1344–45. 
 99. Id. at 1345. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Garner v. Lee, 908 F.3d 845, 862 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 102. Garner v. Lee, No. 2:11-CV-00007 (PKC), 2016 WL 7223335 (E.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 13, 2016), vacated and remanded, 908 F.3d 845 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 103. Garner, 908 F.3d at 862. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 871. 
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In White v. Ryan, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit faced a similar issue of a post-conviction court applying a 
subjective prejudice standard.106  The court presiding over the defendant’s 
post-conviction proceedings was not the same as the sentencing court.107  
However, the post-conviction court assessed Strickland’s prejudice prong 
by answering whether it would have imposed a different sentence, given 
the additional mitigation evidence presented in the post-conviction 
hearing.108  On review, the Ninth Circuit found that the post-conviction 
court’s prejudice determination was improper.109  It held that Strickland 
requires the post-conviction court to consider “the likelihood of a different 
result not just by the trial court but by an appellate court that 
‘independently reweighs the evidence.’”110  
This line of holdings in federal circuit courts illustrates how the 
Western and Southern Districts of the Missouri Court of Appeals have 
misapplied Strickland’s prejudice prong by considering input from the 
decisionmaker from the underlying criminal case.111  
IV. INSTANT DECISION  
In Dawson, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, found 
that the motion court’s conclusion that Dawson failed to satisfy 
Strickland’s prejudice prong was objectively reasonable.112  The court 
stated that, even if plea counsel had presented the additional mitigating 
evidence at Dawson’s sentencing hearing, Dawson would not have 
received a lower sentence. 113  The mitigating evidence that Dawson 
complained was omitted had already largely been presented to the 
sentencing court either through the sentencing assessment report or 
because it was common knowledge for a judge familiar with juvenile 
cases.114  
 
 106. White v. Ryan, 895 F.3d 641, 670 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. White v. Ryan, 895 F.3d 641, 671 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984)). 
 111. See, e.g., White, 895 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Garner v. Lee, 908 
F.3d 845 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 112. Dawson v. State, 611 S.W.3d 761, 772 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020). Because the 
prejudice prong was not met, the performance prong was not addressed. See id. 
 113. Id. at 771. 
 114. Id. 
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However, the Dawson court did not stop at crediting the motion 
court’s objective analysis of Strickland’s prejudice prong.115  The court 
then identified the procedural circumstances of the case: that the motion 
court also served as the sentencing court in the underlying criminal case.116  
Citing Cherco, the court described the “benefit” of such a circumstance, 
where a subjective analysis of the prejudicial impact of additional 
mitigating evidence is possible.117  Specifically, the court stated that where 
circumstances allow for such subjective review, the motion court’s ruling 
is “virtually unchallengeable.”118  Accordingly, the court held that the 
motion court’s finding that Strickland’s prejudice prong had not been met 
was not clearly erroneous and affirmed the motion court’s judgment.119 
Writing in concurrence, Judge Ahuja agreed with the majority’s 
conclusion that Dawson failed to satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong.120  
Judge Ahuja then highlighted the majority’s dictum, in which it noted that 
special deference was given to this motion court’s prejudice determination 
because the motion court was also the sentencing court.121  His 
concurrence then proceeded to cite every decision in which a Missouri 
court of appeals had relied on this construction of Strickland.122  Judge 
Ahuja then explained how Strickland’s prejudice prong required an 
objective inquiry, not a subjective analysis of how additional mitigation 
evidence would have affected the decision of a particular judge or jury, 
noting that Strickland itself made this point “crystal clear” when it 
disregarded testimony by the sentencing judge as irrelevant.123  Next, 
Judge Ahuja provided support for his interpretation of Strickland’s 
prejudice prong with United States Courts of Appeals opinions holding 
that a subjective analysis of prejudice was an erroneous application of 
Strickland.124 
Finally, Judge Ahuja conceded that the majority’s seemingly 
erroneous application of Strickland may have little practical effect when 
reviewing a motion court’s denial of PCR based on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.125  Missouri’s indeterminate sentencing regime 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. (citing Cherco v. State, 309 S.W.3d 819, 831 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010)). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 772. 
 120. Id. (Ahuja, J., concurring). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 773–74. 
 125. Id. at 774. 
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allows broad discretion to sentencing courts and grants them great 
deference on appellate review.126  Also, Missouri Supreme Court Rules 
24.035 and 29.15 allow overturning a motion court’s denial of PCR only 
if the motion court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly 
erroneous.127  Like the majority opinion, Judge Ahuja concluded that it is 
unlikely a motion court’s decision that there was no reasonable probability 
that additional mitigation evidence would have affected sentencing will be 
reversed, even under a correct application of Strickland.128  However, the 
high bar for proving prejudice established by Strickland is hardly reason 
for a reviewing court to raise the bar higher in cases where Strickland was 
arguably not applied correctly below.  
V. COMMENT 
The standard being followed in the Western District is in stark 
contrast to the objective prejudice analysis mandated by Strickland and 
adhered to in federal courts.129  The plain language used in Dawson shows 
that the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, is affording special 
deference to a motion court’s subjective opinion that additional mitigating 
evidence would not have changed a movant’s sentence.130  Moreover, in 
doing so, the Dawson court relied on its own precedent which recognized 
the importance of such a subjective analysis.131  This application of 
Strickland’s prejudice prong highlights an apparent split among the 
Districts of the Missouri Court of Appeals, the difficulty of applying 
Strickland in a discretionary sentencing scheme, and the potential 
difficulties of requiring a trial court to objectively review its own prior 
decision.132  
A. Split Among Missouri Courts of Appeals Districts 
The key to a prejudice analysis under Strickland is objectivity.133  The 
Court in Strickland provided a perfect illustration of this by disregarding 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.; Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035(k), 29.15(k). 
 128. Dawson, 611 S.W.3d at 744 (Ahuja, J., concurring). 
 129. Id. at 772; Garner v. Lee, 908 F.3d 845, 862 (2d Cir. 2018); Williams v. Allen, 
542 F.3d 1326, 1344–45 (11th Cir. 2008); Cherco v. State, 309 S.W.3d 819, 830–831 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
 130. Dawson, 611 S.W.3d at 772 (Ahuja, J., concurring). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694–95 (1984). 
 133. Id. at 695. 
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testimony by the sentencing judge about prejudicial effect as irrelevant.134  
Judge Ahuja’s concurrence in Dawson highlighted the Western District’s 
history of apparent misapplication of Strickland’s prejudice prong by 
giving special deference to a motion court’s apparent subjective 
determinations.135  
It is not clear that the misapplication here is a product of a motion 
court’s reliance on its own subjective judgment.  The opinion in Dawson 
provides no insight into Judge Robb’s basis for concluding that Dawson 
failed to demonstrate prejudice.136  What is clear though, is that an 
appellate review of the motion court’s determination of prejudice should 
give no heightened deference simply because the motion court was also 
the sentencing court.  Such consideration of “a particular judge’s 
sentencing practices” or “idiosyncrasies” is forbidden under Strickland.137  
This line of precedent in the Western District is in apparent conflict with 
established ineffective assistance of counsel review jurisprudence and is 
ripe for correction by the Supreme Court of Missouri.  
Furthermore, notably missing from Judge Ahuja’s concurrence is any 
case from the Eastern District relying on this erroneous application of 
Strickland.138  In fact, the Eastern District has not subscribed to this line of 
cases, as it has not explicitly given special deference to a motion court 
because it was also the sentencing court in the underlying criminal case.  
This apparent split of authority between the Eastern District and the 
Southern and Western District of Missouri’s Court of Appeals provides 
further reason for the Supreme Court of Missouri to address this issue.  
B. Difficulty in applying Strickland in a Discretionary Sentencing 
Scheme 
In true Strickland fashion, Judge Ahuja’s concurrence in Dawson 
questions whether or not the majority’s misapplication of Strickland’s 
prejudice prong actually impacts – or prejudices – a review of a motion 
court’s decision.139  In fact, United States Supreme Court Justice 
O’Connor herself expressed doubt that the precise formulation of a 
prejudice standard would impact a reviewing court’s ultimate decision.140  
But the difficulty of establishing prejudice under Strickland is a poor 
 
 134. Id. at 700. 
 135. Dawson, 611 S.W.3d at 772 (Ahuja, J., concurring). 
 136. Id. at 772. 
 137. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. 
 138. Dawson, 611 S.W.3d at 772 (Ahuja, J., concurring). 
 139. Id. at 774. 
 140. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696–97. 
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reason to make it a near impossibility by deferring entirely to the motion 
court in cases where Strickland was arguably not applied correctly below.  
Both Justice O’Connor and Judge Ahuja recognized that the rare case 
would occur in which a stricter standard will deny PCR to a movant who 
was in fact denied effective assistance of counsel.141  These borderline 
cases, though few in number, justify adherence to Strickland’s objective 
approach, and the principle of leniency dictates that any variance from this 
standard skew in favor of the movant.  
There are two factors that present impediments to an objective 
analysis of the prejudicial effect of missing mitigating evidence in 
Missouri post-conviction proceedings.  First is the discretionary 
sentencing scheme that Missouri trial courts employ.142  The second is that 
courts that presided over the underlying criminal proceeding also hear 
motions for PCR in the same matter.143  
Strickland, though since expanded to apply to non-capital sentencing 
proceedings, reviewed alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at 
sentencing during a capital proceeding.144  Justice O’Connor pointed to the 
structured adversarial nature and standards of decision in capital 
sentencing as important components that enabled an objective review of 
counsel’s effectiveness and any resulting prejudice.145  She also cautioned 
that a more informal sentencing proceeding with standardless sentencing 
discretion might “require a different approach to the definition of 
constitutionally effective assistance.”146  
Applying Strickland’s prejudice prong to non-capital sentencing 
poses two problems.147  First, the relatively unguided sentencing discretion 
which judges and juries are afforded makes appellate review of sentencing 
decisions particularly difficult when there is no indication in the record of 
what factors influenced sentencing.148  Second is the non-discrete choices 
 
 141. Id. at 697 (“The difference, however, should alter the merit of an 
ineffectiveness claim only in the rarest case.”); Dawson, 611 S.W.3d at 774 (Ahuja, 
J., concurring). 
 142. Michael A. Wolff, Missouri’s Information-Based Discretionary Sentencing 
System, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 95, 97 (2006). 
 143. See, e.g., Rowland v. State, 605 S.W.3d 125, 127–28 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020) 
(“The same judge who presided over the two trials involving the underlying charges 
against Movant also served as the PCR motion court.”). 
 144. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686–87. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 686. 
 147. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. REV. 
1069, 1087 (2009). 
 148. Id. at 1087–88. 
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available in non-capital sentencing.149  While a capital sentencing 
proceeding poses a binary choice for a sentencing court, a non-capital 
sentence could be any of a number of years of incarceration, probation, 
fines, or a combination of any of those options.150  These two concerns 
have led to much criticism of Strickland as applied to non-capital 
sentencing.151   
However, these criticisms are not without pushback.  Capital 
sentencing also allows for discretion in sentencing, and judges and juries 
in capital trials are not always required to provide reasoning for their 
decisions.152  This makes the distinction between capital and non-capital 
cases less meaningful in the context of applying Strickland.153  Further, the 
Supreme Court has made it clear that when it comes to prejudice, any 
amount of actual jail time is significant.154  Therefore, on collateral review, 
the seemingly non-discrete nature of non-capital sentencing comes down 
to a binary question: did deficient performance add any time to the 
movant’s sentence?  This leaves a much simpler question for an objective 
inquiry to answer, much like that answered in a capital case.  With both 
obstacles overcome, any justification for deviating from Strickland’s 
objective approach is much less convincing.  
C. Applying Strickland When the Sentencer is the Reviewer 
Even if the general concerns of applying Strickland’s prejudice prong 
to non-capital sentencing were alleviated, it does not resolve the issue 
presented in Dawson.155  The question faced is whether it is appropriate to 
give heightened deference to a motion court’s prejudice determination 
when it is engaged in a collateral review of its own prior sentencing 
decision under a standard that demands objectivity.  
Common sense seems to suggest that the sentencing court would be 
in the best position to determine the prejudicial effect that missing 
mitigating evidence had on a movant’s sentencing proceeding.156  The 
Supreme Court itself acknowledged as much in Landrigan when it noted 
 
 149. Id. at 1089. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 1079. 
 152. Id. at 1087–88. 
 153. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686–87 (1984). 
 154. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001). 
 155. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686–87; Dawson v. State, 611 S.W.3d 761, 772 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2020) (Ahuja, J., concurring). 
 156. See Ty Alper, ‘So What?’: Using Reverse Investigation to Articulate 
Prejudice and Win Post-Conviction Claims, Champion, December 2011, at 46. 
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that the post-conviction court was “ideally situated” to assess the record 
from the underlying criminal case because the same judge presided over 
both sentencing and post-conviction proceedings.157  This impulse is likely 
driven by the aforementioned concerns about applying Strickland to a non-
capital sentencing proceeding in the first place.158  The judge who presided 
over sentencing should know exactly what factors affected the movant’s 
sentence, how those factors would interact with additional mitigating 
evidence, and whether or not the additional evidence would have 
shortened the sentence handed down.159  
Strickland forecloses the use of such subjectivity in a prejudice 
analysis.160  How then can a motion court, inherently bestowed with such 
insight into sentencing, be asked to ignore it and review its own prior 
decision objectively?  The thought experiment is taxing.  A motion court 
with the “benefit” of also being the sentencing court must hear the new 
mitigating evidence raised in a post-conviction motion, ignore all of its 
own “idiosyncrasies” and disregard as irrelevant any thought or memory 
about its own “actual process of decision” or “sentencing practices.”161  
Granted, Strickland tells us to assume that a judge acted according to the 
law;162 however, even taking that as given, the question still exists in a 
discretionary sentencing scheme what sentencing practices a motion court 
should rely on, if not its own.163  
Strickland would seem to require such a court to consider the 
prejudicial effect through the lens of a hypothetical reasonable, 
conscientious, and impartial decisionmaker.164  However, Strickland just 
told us that both the motion court and the sentencing court should be 
assumed to be such.165  So, a motion court is left with the task of becoming 
 
 157. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 476 (2007). But that comment was 
specifically directed toward the post-conviction court’s determination of facts in 
deciding to deny an evidentiary hearing. Id. 
 158. See supra Section V.B. 
 159. Hessick, supra note 147, at 1089. 
 160. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. 
 161. Dawson v. State, 611 S.W.3d 761, 771 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020); Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 695. 
 162. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
 163. Id. at 694. This leaves unaddressed an equal (or perhaps greater) concern that 
a sentencing court, that felt it had shown leniency at sentencing, might be frustrated 
by the appearance of a particular defendant’s motion for PCR on its already crowded 
docket. Id. Such a circumstance strains the reasonableness of the assumption that the 
motion court will attempt in good faith an objective review of prejudice in its own 
prior proceeding. 
 164. Id. at 695. 
 165. Id. 
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some hypothetical, reasonable, conscientious, and impartial 
decisionmaker – other than itself – to determine what this hypothetical 
decisionmaker would do if it were in the position that the motion court is 
actually in.  Reliance on such a system seems to question the very 
necessity of appellate courts in our judicial system.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
An analysis of prejudice under Strickland requires objective review.  
The precedent of the Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals is 
seemingly in conflict with this mandate by giving heightened deference 
when a motion court is able to engage in a subjective review.  This 
precedent is also seemingly in conflict with the approach of the Eastern 
and Southern Districts of the Missouri Court of Appeals.  Therefore, 
Dawson presents an opportunity for the Supreme Court of Missouri to rule 
on an issue that is ripe for review.  
Further, this tension in Dawson highlights the difficulty that the 
Strickland standard of prejudice presents when a motion court is reviewing 
a case that it presided over as a sentencing court.  The plain language of 
Strickland requires the motion court to assume that it followed the law 
when it made its earlier decision at sentencing.166 Strickland then requires 
the motion court to forget its own sentencing practices and any process of 
decision that it might remember from the underlying case.  The motion 
court must instead reweigh all of the aggravating and mitigating evidence 
now available and rule as if it were some other hypothetical, impartial 
decisionmaker.   
This mental exercise stretches the limits of the assumption that a 
motion court will be able to follow the Strickland standard in making its 
decision.  It also begs the question of whether a motion court should be 
able to hear a PCR claim when it also presided over the underlying 
criminal case.  Such a question presents an avenue for future research to 
determine which jurisdictions allow such a practice.  Also of interest 
would be the deference given to the motion court’s analysis of prejudice 




 166. Id. 
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